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Summary 
This paper focuses on why poor and marginalised people still lack access to economic, social and cultural 
rights (also known as positive rights), despite a fairly mainstream support to positive rights in mainstream 
development debates. In part this is due to the problematic division between so-called first and second 
generation of rights. This is particularly true in the water debate where dominant narratives more often see 
water as an economic good rather than as a human right.  
Rights also fail to be realised due to sins of omission where poor states may lack the institutional 
capacity or financial resources to provide rights. Similarly, citizens may not be aware of rights and may not 
have the capacity to mobilise around them. Lack of rights may also be due to sins of commission. Thus states 
or non-state actors such as the World Bank may knowingly put vulnerable people’s rights at risk or even 
violate them with impunity. Economic globalisation also leads to policies that violate basic rights where 
diffuse and unclear rules of accountability exist for global and local players.  
The paper focuses on the right to water in South Africa to examine sins of omission and looks at 
forced displacement caused by the Narmada dams in India to examine sins of commission. In both cases, 
it examines local-level dynamics of rights grievances and claims and argues that there is a blurriness 
between policy and practice around rights practice and violation and that there are often overlaps between 
sins of omission and commission. Finally, the paper highlights the need for accountability structures and 
mechanisms through which compliance and answerability can become an indispensable aspect of the 
human rights regime.  
 
Keywords: human rights; economic, social and cultural rights;  citizenship; accountability;  right to water; 
forced displacement;  Narmada Project;  India and South Africa.  
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1  Introduction 
In the past decade, the rights discourse has gained currency in international development. A human rights 
approach to development is seen as moving away from looking at charity or handouts to empowerment 
and to securing firm rights to ‘the requirements, freedoms and choices necessary for life and development 
in dignity’ (Hausermann 1998). Still, even though support for the human rights movement has been 
growing considerably and a human rights approach to development is now fairly mainstream (ibid; 
ICHRP 2004), there is a growing acknowledgement that many of the world’s poor and marginalised are 
still to enjoy the benefits of these rights, in particular economic, social, and cultural rights. Over the past 
century, citizenship has increasingly been seen as encompassing social and economic rights often known 
as positive rights. Advocacy for positive rights – such as access to water, food, and shelter – marks a sharp 
change from the negative or liberal understanding of rights that underpins notions of liberal democracy. 
Neoliberal thought has traditionally viewed negative civil and political rights as essential to understanding 
what, for example, constitutes citizenship. Yet these traditions have been reluctant to award the same 
widespread attention to social and economic rights, because such rights have strong links to social justice 
and imply moving away from the neoliberal notion that people’s socio-economic status is determined by 
the market (Plant 1998: 57–8).  
Two other reasons may also be at work which I highlight in this paper. One, due to sins of omission1 
citizens may be denied access to social and economic rights. It is well known that poor states may not 
prioritise the imperative to provide education, water and housing for all. Also many developing countries 
may lack the resources to provide rights to all citizens to a live a life in dignity or else may lack the 
institutional capacity to provide these rights. Similarly, citizens may not be aware of rights and may not 
have the capacity to mobilise around them. Two, lack of rights may be due to sins of commission. Thus states 
or non-state actors such as the World Bank may knowingly put vulnerable people’s rights at risk or even 
violate them for a variety of reasons. For example, the freedom of speech and right to protest are severely 
restricted in times of dictatorships. Rights may also be violated in the name of ‘development’. As this 
paper demonstrates, dam-building causes forced displacement which infringes on displaced people’s rights 
to livelihood, land, water, and so on. Moreover, macroeconomic policies in the name of development or 
growth can be introduced by states and global players that violate basic rights. In both cases, it is 
important to examine local-level dynamics of rights grievances and claims and why access to rights is 
hindered. It is also key to examine whether institutional mechanisms and accountable structures are in 
place to address the needs of people denied access to rights due to sins of omission or whether there are 
institutional channels for seeking justice and redress for rights at risk when rights are denied due to sins of 
commission.  
Accountability is usually seen as the means through which the less powerful can hold the more 
powerful to account (Goetz and Jenkins 2004). Traditionally, it is governments that are responsible for 
protecting and governing people’s rights and lives, but there is an increasing need to hold private sector 
                                                          
1  This distinction is not new. This paper, however, seeks to tease out the conceptual and practical implications. 
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and global actors to account whose policies and programmes have a far-reaching impact on the rights and 
wellbeing of poor and vulnerable people. Diffuse and unclear rules of accountability to global players and 
non-state players are problematic when most human rights declarations largely focus on states as the 
primary duty-bearers to both deliver and protect rights. However, economic globalisation often makes the 
state both an adversary and an ally of marginalised people; a protector and violator of their basic rights. In 
many cases, states and other actors violate basic rights with impunity and the mechanisms to hold them to 
account are few and far between.  
This paper demonstrates that accountability is still often a missing factor in the human rights debates, 
arising due to sins of commission and omission with respect to realising rights. For the Millennium 
Development Goals and other processes to be successful, attention must be paid to several on-the-ground 
contradictions and questions: Are there possible paradoxical outcomes arising out of dual commitments to 
both markets and rights which can compromise people’s basic rights as well as make it difficult to enforce 
accountability mechanisms? Can poor institutional capacity and low resource allocation impede the 
realisation of economic and social rights? Do the necessary accountability mechanisms exist to hold the 
powerful to account? Is there an ambiguity about responsibilities and duty-bearers when economic and 
social rights are violated?  
The paper addresses these questions and dilemmas with the help of two cases. The first case 
examines questions around the right to water.2 In 2002, the UN Economic, Social and Cultural Council 
gave a lot of prominence to the right to water through its General Comment No. 15, which is an 
authoritative interpretation of the ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966 
(ICESCR), ratified by 148 states. The Comment, a non-legally binding document, stated explicitly that the 
right to water is a human right and that responsibility for the provision of sufficient, safe, affordable water 
to everyone, without discrimination, rests with the state. Still the right to water is very controversial on 
many fronts. While in principle it is accepted that there is an ‘indivisibility’ of civil and political rights on 
the one hand, and economic, cultural and social rights on the other, in practice there is still no equal 
recognition and there is the assumption that economic and social rights can only be realised once the so-
called first generation of rights are realised. Furthermore, in the water debate, dominant narratives more 
often see water as an economic good rather than as a human right. South Africa, however, stands out in 
this regard and is the only country with a constitutional right to water. Thus, case one examines how sins 
of omission largely prevent many vulnerable groups from having access to the right to water in South 
Africa where the lack of financial resources,  poor institutional capacity and very  little knowledge of rights 
                                                          
2  The Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) in Geneva, which has done extensive research on the 
right to water, clearly lays down the legal basis for the right to water (COHRE 2004). At the 1977 United 
National Water Conference, the Mar del Plata Declaration recognised that all peoples have the right to have 
access to drinking water in quantities and of a quality equal to their basic needs. It has subsequently been 
recognised explicitly in several legally binding treaties, e.g. the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, 1979 (CEDAW); the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 and more 
recently in the General Comment 15.  
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prevent them from being realised and claimed by citizens. Still, even here, sins of commission take place 
since one could argue that processes such as privatisation and cost recovery put basic rights at risk.  
The India case more obviously examines sins of commission where displaced people’s rights are both 
put at risk or blatantly violated through processes of forced displacement. It focuses on how either states 
or agencies such as the World Bank knowingly put rights at risk due to forced displacement in the name 
of ‘development’. Even though policies and safeguards are in place to ostensibly mitigate the risks of 
forced displacement, the history of dam building has led to a string of human rights violations. These 
issues are examined by looking at the case of the Narmada dams in India and by asking how and whether 
agencies such as the Indian government and the World Bank can be held accountable.  
Both cases are the result of primary fieldwork conducted by the author. Fieldwork for the South 
African case took place in 2002 and 2003. Research in India’s Narmada Valley has been ongoing since 
1991. Both cases, though different, highlight serious accountability gaps, contradictions in assigning 
responsibilities for both rights realisation and rights violations and inadequate resource allocations and 
institutional capacity to implement rights. They also highlight serious limitations in the political will to take 
rights seriously and power differentials that allow some actors to continue to violate rights with impunity. 
The paper discussed the two cases and then concludes with some reflections on accountability and rights.  
 
2  Dancing to the two tunes of rights and markets? Implementing South 
Africa’s right to water  
As mentioned, South Africa is the only country that recognises the human right to water at both the 
constitutional and policy level. Moreover, its Free Basic Water (FBW) policy goes against the grain of 
conventional wisdom in the water sector which stresses cost recovery mechanisms and shies away from 
endorsing the human right to water (Mehta 2004). Since early 2000, the Department for Water Affairs and 
Forestry has been investigating providing a basic level of water free to all citizens. In February 2001, the 
government announced that it was going to provide a basic supply of 6,000 litres of safe water per month 
to all households free of charge (based on an average household size of eight people).3 The Water Services 
Act 108 of 1997 states that a basic level of water should be provided to those who cannot pay, and the 
FBW policy emanates from the legal provisions of the Act. The main source of funding for this initiative 
is the ‘Equitable Share’, a grant from the central government to local authorities. It amounts to about R 
7.5 billion a year and is from national taxes for the provision of basic services.4  
While the government of South Africa stands alone internationally in endorsing the constitutional 
right to water, its policies have been informed by several dominant framings in water management which 
include an emphasis on cost recovery, as well as a shift from the state being a direct provider of water-
related goods and services to performing a more regulatory function where privatisation is seen as the 
                                                          
3  This is based on the WHO recommendation for water supply sufficient to promote healthy living set at 
25 litres of safe, clean water per person per day within 200 meters of homes. 
4  DWAF official, personal communication by email, 16 May 2005.  
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means to overcome the past failure of public systems to provide water to the poor. Its policies draw on a 
quasi consensus amongst multilateral and bilateral agencies around issues such as cost recovery, user fees, 
and demand management, which have manifested themselves in both poor and middle income countries 
like South Africa (Mehta 2004). For example, several authors have demonstrated the extent to which the 
World Bank and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) have influenced South African government 
thinking, away from its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) commitments in 
infrastructure and service provision based on entitlement and welfare, towards a cost recovery approach 
which can deprive poor communities of their basic rights to an adequate provision of water (Pauw 2003; 
Bond 2001; 2002). In 1996, total cost recovery became an official policy of the government when it 
adopted its fiscally conservative ‘Growth, Employment and Redistribution’ macroeconomic policy, known 
as GEAR. The central features of the policy are a reduced role for the state, fiscal restraint and the 
promotion of privatisation. 
Thus, alongside the remarkable commitments to providing free water, several World Bank influenced 
policy changes were introduced (Pauw 2003; Bond 2001). These include the ‘credible threat of cutting 
service’ to non-paying consumers, a move which has been linked by some to cholera and other 
gastrointestinal outbreaks (Pauw 2003; McDonald 2002). From 1997, municipalities began to witness 
widespread cut-offs of basic services to non-payers (ibid.). Due to the cost-recovery principle, households 
that used more than the basic amount found themselves unable to pay and faced disconnections. In the 
case of Manquele v Durban Transitional Metropolitan Council 2001 JOL 8956 (D), the High Court found 
that the City Council had a right to disconnect the water supply of the applicant, Mrs Manquele, because 
she chose not to limit herself to the water supply provided to her free of charge. However, commentators 
argue that by completely disconnecting her water supply, Mrs Manquele was deprived even of the free 
basic amount which was problematic since the right to a basic level of water supply exists notwithstanding 
the ability to pay (Community Law Centre 2002). While cut-offs took place even during apartheid times 
(when non-payment for services was a form of political resistance) (Barry Jackson, personal 
communication, 23 December 2003), the indignation is undoubtedly higher today, not least because of the 
strong importance awarded to social and economic rights in South Africa’s constitutions.  
There are controversies around the number of people who have experienced cut-offs. According to 
the Municipal Services project, using representative national survey data from the Human Sciences 
Research Council (HSRC), 10 million people have experienced cut-offs in recent years (McDonald 2002). 
This figure however is contested and has been refuted by the Department for Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF) (Kasrils 2003) and further revised by the HSRC to approximately 2 per cent of all connected 
households, equating to over 250,000 people. Despite DWAF admitting such numbers to be a matter of 
serious concern, McDonald stands by the figure of 10 million and has challenged DWAF and other 
agencies to research a more accurate figure (Sunday Independent 2003).  
As part of GEAR, the South African government also decreased grants and subsidies to local 
municipalities and city councils. This forced cash-strapped local authorities to turn towards privatisation as 
well as to enter into partnerships in order to generate the revenue no longer provided by the national state 
5 
(McKinley 2003). Since local government structures were incapable of dealing with past backlogs on their 
own, they began to privatise public water utilities by entering into service and management ‘partnerships’ 
with external agencies. These ranged from multinational water corporations to South African firms. 
Another form of outsourcing has been through the deployment of the services of parastatal water boards 
that make profits but usually plough them back into infrastructure development (e.g. Rand water). The 
role of consortia was also key. For example, Suez, which collaborated with the apartheid government in 
providing water largely to the white minority, formed Water and Sanitation Services Africa (WSSA). It 
subsequently won ‘delegated management’ contracts in Queenstown, Fort Beaufort and Stutterheim (all in 
the Eastern Cape) (Bond et al. 2001). Ruiters (in Pauw 2003), who researched water privatisation in these 
three towns, argues that water tariffs increased up to 300 per cent between 1994 and 1999. Pauw (2003) 
argues that by 1996, a typical township household was paying up to 30 per cent of its income for water, 
sewerage and electricity. Average income in the area at the time was less than US$60 per month, with 
more than 50 per cent unemployed. Those who could not pay their bills (the majority) were cut off and in 
Queenstown special debt collectors were appointed and a re-instatement fee was introduced that was 
almost twice the average township income. 
 
2.1 Implementing FBW: experiences from the Eastern Cape  
The Eastern Cape is the poorest of South Africa’s nine provinces, with a predominantly rural population, 
high unemployment, and poor access to social services. Located on the south-eastern coast, the Eastern 
Cape province accounts for approximately 16 per cent of South Africa’s population. Of all equitable share 
allocations to the nine provinces the Eastern Cape receives between 17–18 per cent (National Treasury 
1999; 2004). Research was conducted in two district municipalities in the former Transkei.5 The Alfred 
Nzo District Municipality (ANDM) is one of the poorest district municipalities in the Eastern Cape. It has 
50 per cent unemployment and has no manufacturing industry to curb the problem.6 It is also 
characterised by a huge backlog of services such as roads, water services, health facilities, and electricity. It 
is primarily a large poor rural population that comprises the municipality. 214 villages at ANDM have a 
reliable water supply whilst more than 400 villages do not have any water scheme whatsoever. ANDM is 
one of the poorest district municipalities in the Eastern Cape. OR Tambo is a slightly larger municipality 
with a population of over 1.6 million and an unemployment rate of 51.8 per cent. Currently available 
statistics indicate that only 13.2 per cent have acceptable access to safe water (SSA 2002). 
The FBW policy was conceived by DWAF at the national level but its implementation rests with 
local authorities who are designated water services authorities that include both district and local 
municipalities (the latter, however, have to apply to be water services authorities). They are free to 
interpret it according to the resources and capacity available. However, operationalising the policy has 
been difficult. After all, the mere endorsement of the principle of social justice alone cannot suffice in 
                                                          
5  See Mehta and Ntshona (2004) for more details. 
6  Interview with the Deputy Director, Water and Sanitation, Alfred Nzo District Municipality, 10 December 
2002. 
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determining how resources are to be distributed. Instead, as Hayek argues, the distribution of resources 
and implementing rights-based approaches are usually at the discretion of professionals and bureaucrats in 
the public sector, who lack a clear directive on how to ‘implement justice’ (Hayek in Plant 1992: 20). This 
certainly echoes the experiences of officials in South Africa’s Eastern Cape. Many worked in bureaucracies 
of the former homelands and inherited a massive backlog in 1994. They also struggle to grapple with the 
many political and institutional changes arising through South Africa’s decentralisation process.7 
Many of the poorer District Municipalities lack financial and institutional resources to implement the 
policy, despite Equitable Share grants. Moreover, monitoring and rationing the quota of free water is also 
very difficult. Often, it can cost more to install a water meter than to actually provide the water for free8. 
In some cases, the FBW policy has also made charging for water difficult. Many communities understood 
that they would now have to stop paying for water (Jackson 2002). Therefore, for cash-strapped district 
municipalities, raising the money to provide water is now becoming increasingly difficult.9 
How do poor municipalities such as ANDM deal with this? The ANDM has realised that it is costly 
to charge for water in rural areas. They have been down that road in the past and they feel it was too 
taxing and an administrative burden to try to collect tariffs. The ANDM discovered that it costs more to 
collect tariffs than the tariffs collected. Therefore they are now moving to implement FBW. Moreover, 
many of the schemes were under-utilised, for example Build-Operate-Train-Transfer (BOTT) schemes 
which relied on expensive technology and outside experts rather than local knowledge and expertise. In 
one of the pre-paid schemes, it was discovered that only half the population was using the scheme since 
they could not afford to pay for the pre-paid cards and the rest continued to use the usual sources of 
water. Those using the scheme were collecting on average three litres per person per day, which means 
that the investment could not yield the benefits intended and millions of Rand were under-utilised. 
Moreover, the scheme was not addressing the problems of health and freeing women from collecting 
water from afar. It is for this reason that ANDM moved away from the policy of cost recovery and the 
FBW policy is implemented in all the schemes which they have taken over, including the expensive BOTT 
schemes. However ANDM has not announced the policy to the entire district municipality lest they run 
into serious financial problems in implementing it. Thus, many people in the Eastern Cape, especially in 
the remote rural areas, are not even aware of the policy of FBW.  
 
2.2 Free water or basic water?  
It has been argued that FBW is difficult to realise in rural areas which encounter a massive backlog with 
respect to  water supply  and sanitation.  Take ANDM,  in 2003  132 villages  (with a population  of about 
                                                          
7  Budget cuts have gone hand in hand with decentralisation in South Africa (Manor 2001). The function of water 
services provision is now performed by the municipality itself or by other public or private bodies. While this 
process devolves power to local authorities and gives more voice to ordinary citizens, it can also lead to 
shedding of functions and the dumping of ‘unfunded mandates’ on lower levels of government, which poor 
rural municipalities are not able to implement (Olver 1998). 
8  Interview with DWAF official, Mount Ayliff, 23 April 2002. 
9  See also Kihato and Schmitz (2002). 
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170,000 people) were being serviced with basic schemes. By 2010 the district municipality plans to serve 
420 villages (at a population of about 540,000 people) which still only add up to 63 per cent of the villages 
in the entire district. 
Clearly some areas are lagging behind and in terms of water supply the ANDM has to consider both 
the free basic water policy as well as basic water for all. In principle basic water for all takes precedence in 
the work of ANDM together with consideration for sanitation priorities. However there is a trade off in 
implementing free water for some and basic water for all. The ANDM has contracted consultants to 
develop business plans for priority villages within the municipality. A village with a high population size, a 
clinic and/ or a school is generally high in the list of priorities. However, if a priority village is next to a 
village with low priority, the consultants have to develop a business plan that encompasses both villages as 
one project because people in the next village would fail to understand why they are being bypassed whilst 
the other village is earmarked to get a water scheme. Indeed, failure to recognise adjacent villages could 
result in pipes being destroyed and water thefts. 
In order to ensure that basic water is provided, the ANDM has introduced play-pumps as interim 
measures in villages which are unlikely to receive water in the near future.10 The play-pumps would also 
curb the problem of cholera which in the beginning of 2003 was a problem in other district municipalities. 
Play-pumps cost anything between R20,000 and R100,000 with a reservoir. Clearly despite all good 
intentions, district municipalities such as ANDM and OR Tando are finding it difficult to realise FBW for 
all. In part it is due to the backlog inherited in 1994 combined with both financial and institutional 
constraints. At the time of writing, 55.2 per cent of the country’s poor population was being served by 
FBW (DWAF 2005). In 2003, two years after the policy had been announced only 50 per cent of the 
communities had implemented FBW (COSATU 2003) 
 
2.3 Livelihood and poverty reduction impacts  
The FBW policy was not intended to address redistribution issues, and there are other provisions in the 
National Water Act (for example, compulsory licensing) that deal with these. Still, we need to ask how it 
contributes to poverty reduction and wider social justice concerns. For example, it is intended that the 25 
litres of water will be used primarily for drinking and cooking purposes. However, the poor also need to 
be assured of water during scarcity periods for their farming activities based on subsistence. The 25 litres a 
day policy largely focuses on domestic water supply, and not on wider concerns of livelihood security and 
how to restructure existing water-user practices.  
The Committee on Economic and Social rights does not lay down particular standards on how much 
water should be provided. It states that water supply must be sufficient for personal and domestic uses, as 
corresponding to WHO standards which constitute a minimum of 50–100 litres per day with an absolute 
minimum of 20 litres per day (COHRE 2004: 8). Thus South Africa is providing close to the absolute 
                                                          
10  Play-pumps are designed in such a way that anyone can operate them. Children, who can get on and off the 
wheel as they play, can turn around the horizontal wheel. The structure of the play-pump can also cater for 
small billboards, where adverts that are visible from a distance can be posted. 
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minimum.11 This is why trade union leaders and other advocates in South Africa argue that the South 
African State should grant everybody at least 50 litres of water per day per capita. This, they argue, is the 
only way in which poor farmers can successfully maintain their livelihoods and thus escape the trap of 
poverty and dependence on pension grants.12  
Do enforceable social and economic rights make a difference to people’s lives and livelihoods? As 
demonstrated above, rights-based approaches may not necessarily radically redistribute resources in a 
society. But do they make a difference to poor people and what are local level village experiences of FBW? 
In Masakala village in the Eastern Cape, with the introduction of the FBW policy, poor people have 
gained access to water. Take the case of three rural women, two are pensioners and one is unemployed. 
Mabombo is 61 years old and is entitled to an old age pension. Before the implementation of the FBW 
policy, she used to collect water from the spring far from her house, and used a ten-litre container to make 
two or three trips to the spring before sunrise. Collection from the spring was difficult for her because she 
had to wait for the sediments to settle before collecting. She now feels that life has improved since the 
introduction of the FBW policy. She does not have to wake up in the morning before the livestock make 
the spring water murky and can concentrate her energy on other work. She uses the FBW for washing, 
drinking and cooking, though she still visits the spring to wash blankets. Mathungu, 70 years old, also 
supports a large family with her old age pension grant. She could not afford the R10 before the 
implementation of the FBW policy in order to pay for water services in her village. She too no longer 
needs to go to the spring on a daily basis for her water tasks. Masakala is an unemployed member of the 
water committee. Her main complaint with the FBW is the rules on how water should be consumed. She 
feels that when she paid R10 a month for water she used as much as she wanted but under the FBW 
policy, there are limits. Occasionally she needs to pay for additional water when she is hosting a cultural 
event in her house (see Mehta and Ntshona 2004 for more details).   
Clearly, FBW has made a significant difference to the everyday lives of people like Mathungu, 
Masakala and Mabombo. For one, it frees women from the time taken to collect water and the health 
benefits are clear since they do not need to resort to unprotected streams. However, one could ask 
whether it is really addressing poverty reduction goals since the water cannot be used for agricultural 
production and livelihoods purposes. In Mdudwa village people are unhappy with the scheme because 
they feel it has not improved people’s livelihoods and has also imposed restrictions on water use for 
activities which are important to them (such as washing blankets for funerals and other ceremonies). 
Moreover, there are also still many people in the Eastern Cape who are not aware of the FBW policy. 
 
                                                          
11  Of course what counts as ‘sufficient water’ is controversial. People can also survive on 10 litres a day (Mehta 
2005).   
12  Lance Veotee, interview, 15 April 2002. 
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2.4 Implementing the right to water: some conclusions  
One, there has not been a standardised response to FBW with water service providers (who could be 
private companies, water boards, district municipalities, or community-based organisations) interpreting 
the policy in different ways. The result is that some South African citizens still do not enjoy FBW and 
many are not even aware of their constitutional right to 25 free litres of water per day. Thus there is very 
uneven access to the right to water in South Africa.  
Two, while FBW has made a difference to the lives of poor people, the issue of poverty reduction 
seems to be lagging behind. The General Comment provides that States are required to ensure each 
person has access to sufficient, safe, acceptable, accessible and affordable water for personal and domestic 
use, and this is what the 25 litres per day per person achieves. But the Committee also states that while 
priority must be given to water for personal and domestic use, it is also important to recognise the need 
for water to meet the most essential aspects of each of the other relevant human rights (e.g. right to 
livelihood, food etc.) for which South Africa’s provision of 25 litres does not suffice.  
Three, the experiences of the Eastern Cape highlight the difficulties in implementing the principles of 
free basic water and cost recovery in tandem. With respect to affordability, the Committee states that 
water should be affordable and not reduce a person’s capacity to buy other essential goods, such as food, 
housing etc. This normally means that water must be subsidised for poor communities and provided free 
where necessary. This is the spirit of the FBW policy. However, this analysis has demonstrated how cost 
recovery, and privatisation approaches also dominate South Africa’s water domain. In the villages studied 
both willingness and ability to pay for water services were not very high, cost recovery was limited and 
there were many defaulters on payment for water use. When cost was an issue, a number of people 
continued to use their usual unprotected sources of water. Apart from health implications (e.g. risk of 
cholera outbreaks), the returns on investment for schemes where cost recovery applies could not be 
realised since people did not always use them. In urban areas, cost recovery has led to controversial cut-
offs which directly impact on the right to water. Thus cost recovery can run counter to realising economic 
and social rights. Furthermore, the impacts of global policy prescriptions such as cost recovery and 
decentralisation have led to a marked lack of financial and institutional resources to realise rights. Thus 
while it may be possible to dance to the two tunes of rights and markets in some urban middle class areas 
and big cities, in poor regions, dual commitments to both rights and markets can fail to provide the 
intended outcome. 
Finally, there is also the larger question of how rights are interpreted and deployed by local people. In 
urban areas, famous cases such as Grootboom (named after Irene Grootboom) have highlighted that poor 
people can be agents of change as they appeal to the Constitutional Court to advance their constitutional 
rights to basic services. In 2000, residents of Wallacedene, a large shantytown in the Cape Town area 
made legal history when the Constitutional Court ruled in favour of their housing rights. Today, four years 
on, the people behind the historic Wallacedene settlement are still waiting for proper housing facilities. In 
fact, as one commentator argues, the only concrete building that the residents have is a stinking ablution 
block with broken pipes and inadequate sanitation facilities (Schoonakev 2004). Since the Constitutional 
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Court failed to specify which manifestation of the state – whether national, provincial or local – should 
honour the rights of the residents, there is a lack of clarity on where the locus of responsibility lies with 
regard to the implementation of the Grootboom judgement. The Constitutional Court also did not play 
any role in supervising or overseeing the implementation of the various orders and the South Africa 
Human Rights Commission is only playing a monitoring role. Residents are angry because they now do 
not know whom to turn to. This highlights the difficulties around specifying duty bearers and their 
responsibilities in the case of implementing social and economic rights.  
Still, overall people are asserting their right to water in South Africa, especially in the urban areas. 
Protests against disconnections are widespread. On 6 April 2002, 87 people were arrested in Johannesburg 
who were protesting against water and electricity cut-offs. This is due to the replacement of flat rate 
payments for services by metered bills. Professor Kidd of KwaZulu- Natal University examined how the 
courts have handled the issue of cut-offs in conjunction with the South African constitutions and the 
Water Service Act. He concludes that while water services can be disconnected if appropriate measures are 
followed, consumers who are cut off due to non-payments must have their supply restricted rather than 
discontinued completely (Kidd 2003). 
In remote rural areas such as the Eastern Cape, the capacity of citizens to claim their constitutional 
rights to basic services is far lower than in the cities. Many people are not aware of their constitutional 
right to water. Therefore they are less likely to hold the government to account if their rights are violated. 
In part this is because of their ignorance of these rights, and in part it is because the mediators of justice 
(e.g. courts, lawyers, activists) are more likely to operate in metropolitan areas than in remote ones.  
These problems should not detract from the fact that constitutional endorsements to social and 
economic rights are very important. In acknowledging the right to water, the South African government 
has gone against the grain of conventional wisdoms around both questions of rights and entitlements of 
citizens and donor debates around water provision. In this respect, the FBW is a remarkable achievement. 
Due to the Constitutional right to water, poor people have moved the courts to seek interim relief from 
disconnections with success.13 However this paper has shown that in order to be more effective, the sins 
of omission such as poor institutional capacity and financial resources need to be overcome. There is also 
the need to pay attention to poverty and livelihood questions, problematic implementation of the policy, 
the lack of awareness and the variable levels of accountability mechanisms to provide redress. 
 
                                                          
13  For example, in Hillbrow, Johannesburg, the residents successfully managed the authorities to restore the water 
supply on a temporary basis (Community Law Centre 2002). 
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3  Seeking redress and struggles for accountability: violations of rights 
in India’s Narmada Valley  
 
3.1 Dam-based displacement in India 
In recent decades, post-independent India has witnessed the emergence of new social movements 
questioning conventional ‘development’ models and the role of the state in decision-making processes 
concerning access to and control over natural resources. Be they movements protesting against large 
dams, thermal plants or the patenting of indigenous seeds and plants, all of them have highlighted how the 
state and its international partners (e.g. the World Bank) have sanctioned and implemented development 
schemes that have been inimical to the livelihoods of the poor and marginalised in rural areas. Nowhere is 
this more evident than with large dams. While large dams might have made some parts of the desert 
bloom and led to full granaries and enhanced food security, they have not been without high social and 
environmental costs (cf. McCully 1996; Goldsmith and Hildyard 1992). For the people adversely affected 
by large dams, they have meant displacement and homelessness. The rivers, expected to be transformed 
by dams and reservoirs to harness power and water, have become rivers of sorrow for the displaced 
people living on their banks (Thukral 1992). Indeed, since independence, around 30–50 million Indians – 
mainly from adivasi (tribal)14 and low caste communities – have lost their lands and livelihoods due to the 
forced displacement caused by the reservoir flooding of large dams (ibid; Roy 1999). Displacement and 
resettlement have been traumatic and protracted processes that have uprooted people from their familiar 
environment. Largely, the planning and implementation of resettlement and rehabilitation has varied from 
state to state and has proceeded on a very ad hoc and incremental basis (cf. Thukral 1992; Fernandes and 
Thukral 1989; Dreze et al. 1997). Little wonder, then, that that many of the oustees of dams such as Ukai 
in Gujarat, Hirakud in Orissa and Bhakra Nangal in the Punjab have joined the ranks of urban slum 
dwellers, migrant workers or fallen into the cycle of debt bondage. Out of the millions displaced, only 25 
per cent have been rehabilitated (Parasuraman 1997). The rest have undergone drastic changes in their 
economic, socio-cultural, and nutritional contexts, which have been well documented in various studies 
(e.g. Thukral 1992; Fernandes and Thukral 1989; Morse and Berger 1992).  
 
3.2 The Narmada Project  
The dams on the Narmada River also stand out with regards to their high social costs. They are also 
famous due to the activities of the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada Movement, henceforth 
Andolan). The Andolan has successfully highlighted and drawn home to millions all over the globe the 
plight of the displaced peoples affected by the Narmada dams and the dark sides of top-down projects 
such as large dams. It has also inspired several social and environmental struggles on the Indian sub-
continent and raised questions important for India’s future such as sustainable development, participation, 
the rights of indigenous peoples, the viability or non-viability of large top-down centralist projects and the 
                                                          
14  Adivasis literally mean ‘original/ earliest settlers’. This term is used to designate the indigenous peoples of India, 
officially known as ‘scheduled tribes’, who make up about 7 per cent of the entire population.  
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mobilisation of protest. Over the years, the Andolan adopted a strategy of non-cooperation, mass 
mobilisation and non-violent forms of protest including rallies, picketing, sit-ins, fasts and the more 
extreme case of jal samapan (save or drown actions). By following the slogan, ‘We will drown, but not 
move’ activist villagers have refused to vacate their ancestral homes. As a result they have resisted and 
faced police atrocities and repressive tactics including mass arrests, harassment, the molesting of women 
and the clear felling of their forests (see Mehta 2000).  
The Narmada Project comprises two mega-dams, 30 large dams, 135 medium dams and 300 small 
reservoirs and dams. All these projects, if realised, will most certainly totally transform the Narmada River, 
India’s holy and last free-flowing river. One of the mega dams, the Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) is 
supposed to bring water to some 30 million people and irrigate 1.8 million hectares of land with a capacity 
of 1450 megawatts of power (Raj 1991). The 163-metre dam, if completed, will submerge 37,000 hectares 
of forest and prime agricultural land. Apart from the various disputes about its purported benefits and 
environmental impacts, it has been criticised due to its deleterious human consequences. The project will 
negatively affect the homes, lands and livelihoods of about a million people. About 250,000 people will be 
directly impacted and lose their homes due to reservoir submergence in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Madhya 
Pradesh. The rest will be indirectly affected due to the effects of the canal construction and downstream 
impacts of the dam. In 1992, the report of an independent review set up by the World Bank, also known 
as the Morse Report, found that the World Bank and the government of India had violated the provisions 
of the Bank’s resettlement, tribal peoples as well as environmental policies (Morse and Berger 1992). In 
1993, the Government of India cancelled the remaining balance of the loan and the World Bank withdrew 
its funding from the project in 1993 due to national and international criticism. During most of the 1990s, 
work on the dam had stopped since the Indian Supreme Court had passed a stay order on the dam’s 
construction for six years. In 2000 a controversial Supreme Court judgment allowed the dam’s 
construction to go ahead.  
 
3.3 Rights violations in the Narmada Valley 
Since 1991, every year during the monsoons (in particular during heavy rains) tribal villages have been 
partially submerged by the swollen waters of the Narmada River. A river known to them as Mother is 
converted to a death trap as the rising waters submerge crops and homes. Resettlement and rehabilitation 
must follow the procedures set by the following: the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal Award 
(NWDT);15  the directions  of the Indian  Supreme Court of 2001;16  the  rehabilitation  and resettlement 
                                                          
15  The Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT) was established in 1969 by the Indian government to settle 
conflicts over the Narmada river between states, concerning sharing the waters, rehabilitating displaced people, 
and the height of the dam, etc. The Tribunal laid down guidelines for the rehabilitation of the affected 
population in 1979 (Clark and Bhardwaj 2003). 
16  In October 2001, the Supreme Court of India issued directions in relation to the Sardar Sarovar Project, 
including the obligation to comply with the relief and rehabilitation work, and ‘take the necessary ameliorative 
and compensatory measures for environmental protection ‘ (Clark and Bhardwaj 2003: 9) 
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policies of the states of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra;17 World Bank policies18 as well as 
India’s human rights obligations.19 Further international human rights instruments relevant for dam-based 
displacement include: 
 
• The 1986 General Assembly Declaration on the Right to Development endorses individuals’ rights to 
participate and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development to realise fundamental 
human freedoms. The Declaration also asserts the right of peoples to self-determination and their 
‘inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources. While, in principle it 
could also includes states’ right to development according to Rajagopal’s interpretation, the language 
makes it clear that ‘local communities and individuals, not states, have the right to development’ 
(Rajagopal 2000: 5)   
• The Right to Life and Livelihood is founded in the UDHR (Article 3) and Articles 6 and 11 of the 
ICESCR (Robinson 2003: 14). 
• The 1991 International Labour Organisation Convention concerning Indigenous and tribal peoples 
in Independent Countries (ILO 169) recognises that Indigenous and tribal peoples have a right to 
take part in the decision-making processes of the States in which they live.  
• In November 2002, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
adopted the General Comment on the right to water.20 
• In 1998, the UN Representative on Internally displaced persons came up with Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement. Even though they are not a binding legal document, they are based on and 
consistent with international human rights law, humanitarian and refugee law. Principle 6 explicitly 
makes a reference to development-induced-displacement (Robinson 2003: 3).21 
 
                                                          
17  The rehabilitation and resettlement policies of the states of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat provide 
policies for land allocation as well as a rehabilitation grant or subsistence allowance, transport grants, as well as 
compensation for land and housing and civic amenities such as drinking water, electricity, a primary school, 
place of worship, etc. (NCA 2005).  
18  The World Bank’s policies for Involuntary Resettlement and Indigenous Peoples, of December 2001 aim to 
‘address and mitigate’ the risks of impoverishment. The policy maintains that involuntary resettlement should 
be avoided or where feasible or minimised. Where resettlement is not avoidable, it should take the form of 
sustainable development, with investment resources to enable displaced persons to share in the benefits of the 
project. Resettlement should be carried out in a participatory manner (World Bank 2001). 
19  India has signed on to various international human rights treaties which recognise, among others, the right to 
life, freedom of movement and to choose one’s residence, and to an adequate standard of living, including 
adequate food, clothing and housing. The Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights requires, for 
instance, that procedural guarantees be offered by the government, including ‘genuine consultation with the 
project-affected people, the issue of adequate notice to all affected persons prior to the date of eviction, and 
the provision of legal remedies and legal aid where applicable’ (Cullet 2000: 2 of 5) 
20  The Committee stressed the state’s legal responsibility in fulfilling the right and defined water as a social and 
cultural good and not solely an economic commodity. 
21  The Guiding Principles are key because they go beyond ‘refugee-like criteria to include those displaced by 
‘natural or human-made disasters’. Principle 6 states clearly: ‘Every human being shall have the right to be 
protected against being arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of habitual residence;’ this 
prohibition against arbitrary displacement ‘ includes displacement in cases of large-scale development projects 
which are not justified by compelling and overriding public interests’ (Robinson 2003: 3).  
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The World Bank policies were in force when the 1985 loan was approved to the Sardar Sarovar. 
According to legal specialists, they continue to apply to the project and will continue to apply until the 
loan is repaid. The most relevant policy includes the Involuntary Resettlement Policy (OM S233, Issued 
February 1980) which clearly states that settlers’ living standards need to at least match those before 
resettlement and that the Bank will avoid or minimise involuntary resettlement wherever feasible (Clark 
and Bhardwaj 2003: 7). Furthermore, the tribal people’s policy (OM S 234, Issued 1982) clearly states that 
wherever tribal people are involved, projects must be designed to safeguard the special interests and well 
being of tribals.22 Even though the World Bank is no longer involved in the project, according to 
advocacy groups the World Bank should not be absolved of its responsibility for ensuring that the project 
continues in compliance with its policies and safeguards. The World Bank’s General Counsel also clarified 
that the government of India is legally obligated towards the Bank of carry out its obligations under the 
loan agreement (Clark 2003). Similarly, this should not absolve the Central government and the three 
states to comply with internationally and nationally recognised standards around resettlement and 
rehabilitation. But the Bank has failed to exercise its supervision and monitoring obligations. There is a 
complete lack of public accountability on the part of the World Bank. This is particularly problematic for 
projects involving displacement, since relocation usually takes place many years after the loan is disbursed. 
Thus local people have no official recourse for redress of violations.  
This is paradoxical since it was the protest in the Narmada Valley that led to the constitution of the 
first ever World Bank Independent review and also of the Inspection Panel and the convening of the 
World Commission on Dams. Thus, while the protest movement has had significant victories with respect 
to the creation of new policies and institutions, their lot on the ground has not improved significantly. 
Largely, there has not been compliance of the basic principle of the NWDT Award which stipulates that 
displaced people must be resettled at least one year before submergence and that they should be 
completely rehabilitated in their new homes six months before submergence. Moreover, increases in the 
dam’s height have not proceeded hand in hand with rehabilitation (Clark 2003). In 1993, I witnessed how 
villagers in Vagdam (Gujarat) and Manibeli (Maharashtra) lost most of their belongings, houses and lands 
to the rising waters and many of them still have not been rehabilitated. In 2001, a fact-finding mission 
found that a large number of people affected at 90 m had not been rehabilitated (Clark and Bhardwaj 
2003). In 2002, floodwaters during the monsoon of September submerged homes, crops, and livestock 
across the Narmada Valley. People had to be pulled out of hip-high water by the police. People stood in 
rising waters in their homes and the police arrived to arrest them. A young adivasi woman from Madhya 
Pradesh told a gathering that I attended in Delhi in 2002:   
 
A few months ago, a team surveyed the whole village, the lands, the assets and the resettlement 
package. The team assured us that they would not allow any submergence to take place until the 
                                                          
22  It is well known that indigenous peoples all over the world are struggling to have recognition of the ‘right to 
have rights’ as citizens and human beings (ICHRP 2004: 19). Struggles like Narmada also highlight the struggle 
around what constitutes ‘indigenous.’  
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resettlement process was completed. But still on the day when the water came, 5000 police personnel 
came to the village with only four women police. We asked why so many police had come … All of a 
sudden they began dragging us out of our houses. They even dragged out the women who had no 
clothes with them. They pulled children and even a 3-month-old baby who could barely survive 
without its mother. There was another four-year-old child who was found only after 15 days. On the 
one hand, our village was filling with water and on the other hand the police were dumping people 
forcibly in makeshift camps.’ 
 
Every year when submergence occurs, there are problems with the availability of food supply and access 
to drinking water due to the destruction of crops and the complete transformation of the river (Clark and 
Bhardwaj 2003). Furthermore, the Indian government is also known to resort to draconian measures to 
make protest illegal and thus legitimise mass arrests which can severely impinge on displaced people’s civil 
and political rights and also contravene Article 19 of the Indian Constitution which allows people to 
protest peacefully.   
In Madhya Pradesh, interviews with oustees and activists revealed that there is a marked lack of 
available land and the authorities often entice oustees to accept cash compensation instead of providing 
them with land. This is a clear violation of the land-for-land policy which constitutes best practice both in 
India and internationally. There is also a lack of information about displacement and rehabilitation 
everywhere and displaced people experience a great deal of uncertainty. It is not uncommon to hear 
graphic stories about not being told about the dam, when and who would be submerged, what the 
entitlements are, thus violating oustees’ right to information and participation.  
But even people rehabilitated over a decade ago and living in the 200 resettlement sites scattered 
across Gujarat are unhappy and lack access to basic rights. Many of the resettlement sites have poor 
agricultural land, lack water and basic amenities. One such place is Malu, a resettlement site in Gujarat, 
India. The residents of Malu were moved there about 12 years ago after being displaced from their homes 
along the banks of the Narmada River to make way for the construction of the Sardar Sarovar Project. 
One of the biggest sources of illness for the people of Malu is the poor water quality. The changes of 
access to water for the displaced people in Gujarat has led to a decline in their sense of well-being because 
the once taken for granted freedoms around water – central to their life – have been taken away. A free 
flowing river, which gave them 24-hour access, has been replaced by various unreliable sources that 
provide water for very short periods. Displaced people have little control over the operation or 
maintenance of these taps or indeed the quantity of water available daily. Even though there are several 
standpoints and taps around the site, the water supply is not as reliable. The autonomy that women 
enjoyed in collecting water whenever they wanted has been lost. Instead, they are dependent on the 
government, host villagers and other people for their daily supply. Moreover, the quality of the water is 
also highly problematic; illnesses such as diarrhoea, vomiting and other water-borne diseases are quite 
rampant in the resettlement village (Mehta and Punja, forthcoming). My research in 2000 showed that the 
poor quality of water has also led to an increase in mortality. Many households in Malu have lost family 
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members in the village, especially children. The number of children dying in the 0–1 year age group was 
double that of the host village. In the 1–5 year age group, it was nearly six times higher in 2000. The 
family that looked after me while I stayed there lost two children, their son from septicaemia in August 
2000 and in November, their granddaughter died at nine months. In addition, everybody, including adults, 
spoke of reduced immunity and weakness. The mixing of different water sources everyday and the lack of 
forest vegetables and herbs also seemed to contribute to their frailty.  
 
3.4 Accountability issues  
Who is accountable to these displaced people and to whom can they turn to for redress? Let me focus on 
the difficulties of holding both the State and World Bank accountable. For oustees who have experienced 
human rights violations, the first port of call has been the relevant resettlement agency in one of the three 
states of Maharashtra, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh and the bureaucracies concerned (for example, those 
overseeing resettlement, forest, rural development issues). Largely, however, these various organs are full 
of biases that make it difficult for oustees to seek redress or claim accountability without the help of 
mediators such as activists or voluntary organisations. For example, oustees need to endure several 
bureaucratic procedures (such as endless form filling/ meetings) that can be very intimidating for groups, 
especially tribals who are not familiar with the written word. In response to the growing complaints by 
oustees, the Supreme Court in 1999 mandated the setting up of a Grievance Redressal Authority (GRA) 
for Gujarat, and in 2000 for Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra, to look into the rehabilitation-related 
grievances of the project-affected people. Each of these GRAs is headed by a retired Supreme Court or 
High Court judge. The Rehabilitation and Resettlement Sub-Group of the Narmada Control Authority is 
required by the Supreme Court to consult the GRAs before giving a clearance that rehabilitation at a 
particular height is complete (Clark and Bhardwaj 2003). In some cases, this has helped and some oustees 
have indeed been able to have their problems addressed and even had their land changed. But the 
grievance redressal procedure can also be rather partisan and displays elite biases. GRA officials often do 
not visit the affected areas, are not attentive during meetings and the filing of complaints and the endless 
rounds of meetings can add a new layer of bureaucracy for the displaced.  
Sit-ins, protest and hunger strikes in state capitals and in Delhi have led to Ministers and senior 
bureaucrats, members of the National Human Rights Commission and National Women’s Commission 
making visits to the affected areas and to resettlement villages. In an incremental way, the lot of some 
oustees has improved as a result of these massive protests. For example, land has been re-allocated and 
basic services have been provided. Still, despite mass mobilisation, high profile campaigns and media 
presence, rights continue to be violated with impunity in the Narmada Valley. Moreover, the Narmada 
Control Authority (NCA) has often agreed to increases in the dam’s height despite illegalities and failures 
related to Resettlement and Rehabilitation (R and R). The state governments claim that they have already 
provided R and R and that the affected people should address their concerns to the GRA. The Central 
government often passes the buck to the relevant state governments.  
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Due to these institutional and accountability failures there are now calls to re-focus attention on the 
World Bank. While most displaced people do not want the World Bank to be involved, they continue to 
hold it responsible for its role in promoting a project that so clearly violates its own policies as well as 
international human rights standards. Dana Clark of the International Accountability Project therefore 
suggests that the Bank enforce terms of the loan conditions since it has ongoing relationships with both 
the Indian government as well as with the three states through ongoing irrigation and power sector loads. 
Moreover, the Board of Executive Directors who sanctioned the project needs to have a ‘fiduciary’ 
responsibility to take action and uphold the integrity of the project and address the accountability gaps and 
implementation failures. According to the Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction (COHRE) both the 
IADB and the World Bank are obliged to provide reparations to survivors and their families due to both 
the massacre and the desperate inadequate living conditions after resettlement.  
But how can such mechanisms be installed? At the moment, International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) such as the World Bank disclaim all responsibility and claim that it is up to the borrowers to fulfil 
loan agreements. Still, as economist Kunibert Raffer argues, there is a need for reforms to make the IFIs 
financially accountable (Bretton Woods Project 2004). At the moment, there is a ‘perverse incentive 
structure’ which calls for new loans to make good on badly implemented projects and adjustment schemes 
which end up benefiting the IFIs. Instead, it has been suggested that an international court of arbitration 
could decide on how the IFI and borrower countries could share costs in the case of disagreements after 
complaints are filed by governments, NGOs and the affected people (Bretton Woods Project 2004).  
 
4  Key lessons from the case studies  
What lessons emerge from the case studies regarding implementing and realising rights and the role of 
accountability? Case one largely focussed on sins of omission whereby, despite the existence of a 
constitutional right to water and related policies, millions in South Africa were either not aware or not 
given access to these rights. Thus, a right conceived at the national level was still to be realised on the 
ground in many parts of the country. In some areas, the right to water was also hindered by market 
processes such as cost recovery leading to controversial cut-offs. Case two examined sins of commission 
and demonstrated how despite a range of international and national standards as well as human rights 
instruments, rights were being violated with impunity by both the Indian government and the World 
Bank. It would however be misleading to make a sharp distinction between sins of omission and 
commission. The South African government, by allowing liberalisation and market-driven approaches in 
the water sector that can impinge on people’s basic rights, is also guilty of sins of commission. Similarly, 
the Indian government and the World Bank, by not providing appropriate institutional structures, commit 
sins of omission despite professing to uphold the rights of displaced people. To recap, it is worth 
examining some of the questions raised earlier in the paper: why and how are economic and social rights 
compromised  despite the  best intentions?  What are the  contradictions that  continue to  exist regarding 
18 
duty bearers, protectors and violators of rights? Why do rights continue to be violated with impunity in 
the case of forced displacement? I now attempt to answer these questions by teasing out key lessons 
emerging from both these cases.  
 
4.1 Institutional mechanisms and accountability structures  
Largely the law, both national and international, is a solid basis for holding governments accountable for 
protecting human rights for all and for promoting national legislative, policy and other initiatives which 
comply fully with the international standards that governments themselves have accepted. Both South 
Africa and India have the necessary legislation in place and have rights-based elements in their 
constitutions. Both countries have human rights commissions that monitor how rights are being violated 
or realised. In both cases, the human rights commissions have taken pro-poor stances. But the 
institutional arrangements for adequate follow up may sometimes be limited. This is particularly true for 
Narmada where the monitoring of human rights violations has not necessarily led to a change in the 
perception that officials can continue to disregard human rights in order to carry on with dam-building 
activities. As the International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP) rightly says ‘while national 
human rights commissions can promote and validate a human rights culture in the right circumstances, 
they can equally remain ineffectual when they operate in a political culture that ignores or is antagonistic 
to human rights.’ (ICHRP 2004: 42).  
Largely, judicial activism has enhanced the voice of the poor and played a very constructive role 
(Goetz and Jenkins 2004). Indeed, Grootboom in South Africa has demonstrated how judges’ 
constitutional interpretation can expand the scope of rights and thus increase the state’s obligations to 
citizens. But even in Grootboom, despite a landmark constitutional judgment, the residents still lack 
dwellings and water and sanitation facilities that allow them to live in dignity and it is alleged that the key 
activist, Irene Grootboom, has vanished. In India, too, much is made of judicial activism and the role of 
Supreme Court in enhancing voice. But the Narmada judgement changed this perception. The 
controversial 2000 Supreme Court judgement is considered by many to be a highly emotive and non-
judicial judgement, making many in India now cautious of following the public interest litigation route. 
Thus the law turned out to be highly arbitrary, influenced by powerful vested interests and narratives and 
thus cannot always be relied upon to be a panacea for ongoing injustices.23  
Finally, even accountability institutions that are in place may display variable outcomes. Indeed, as 
Niraja Gopal Jayal argues, ostensibly pro-poor institutions can work towards enhancing the interests of 
the more privileged sections of society (Jayal 1999). Thus even watchdog institutions such as the GRA can 
display elite biases and are less sensitive to exclusions due to lack of education or information. Moreover, 
‘accountability to less powerful members is rarely a part of the implicit contracts or compacts underlying 
uneven power relations’ in such institutions (Goetz and Jenkins 2004: 41). Thus bureaucrats may not see it 
                                                          
23  Even the ICHRP notes that when indigenous peoples use the Supreme Court the outcomes can be variable. 
For example, Oaxaca Indians found that the Mexican Supreme Court refused to accept their evidence (ICHRP 
2004: 22).  
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in their remit to be partisan to issues concerning social justice, equity and human rights. Moreover, 
institutionalised biases often exist in the interest of the rich since the ability to seek redress hinges on the 
ability to communicate in dominant languages, interact with lawyers, or have massive endurance. Thus 
efforts to institutionalise rights and seek accountability can be thwarted by systematic malfunctions in key 
accountability mechanisms. This need not be just due to elite capture but also due to systematic bias 
against the poor (ibid.).  
In the case of Narmada, despite many victories and the establishment of several new institutional 
processes that should enhance the rights of displaced people around the world (e.g. the Inspection Panel, 
World Commission on Dams, GRAs), human rights continue to be violated with impunity in India. The 
World Bank also has no mechanisms to ensure that borrowers comply with loan regulations and standards 
and tends to pass the buck to borrower countries. While human rights commentators such as the ICHRP 
(2004) talk of creating a favourable institutional environment in which to realise human rights and seek 
accountability, often the institutional mechanisms in place may not end up being very pro-poor in their 
outcomes. Furthermore, access to economic and social rights are hindered due to the ignorance of 
internationally recognised rights and the lack of legal training among officials working with marginalised 
groups.  
 
4.2 Duty bearers, protectors and violators  
The two cases highlight problems around apportioning blame for rights violations and identifying who 
bears obligations and responsibilities to realise rights. This is particularly true in the contemporary world 
characterised by processes of economic globalisation which has led to the proliferation of demands for 
new ways of making powerful actors, within and beyond the state, accountable for the impact of their 
actions on poor people (Goetz and Jenkins 2004: 28). With respect to the right to water, States are clearly 
responsible for ensuring the progressive realisation of the right to water which is laid out in the General 
Comment (COHRE 2004). Thus the formulation of FBW and the measures in place to implement FBW 
in South Africa are steps forward in this regard. Still the case study demonstrated massive problems in 
implementation, some of which were due to decentralisation processes through which local authorities 
have assumed many responsibilities but have had few resources (both financial and institutional) to 
implement the right to water.  
Moreover, with the inclusion of new private actors, states are not merely enforcers of rights, but 
increasingly act as ‘regulators’ and facilitators of rights (INTRAC 2003). Unfortunately, the General 
Comment and other such instruments do not explicitly mention private actors as accountable and 
responsible. Ironically too, rights are denied at the ‘behest of powers beyond the state itself’ (INTRAC 
2003: 3). For example, IMF and World Bank policies oblige states to curtail basic services and impose 
charges that exclude large numbers of vulnerable people, thus helping to perpetuate sins of commission. 
But it is unthinkable that the World Bank or the IMF could be directly held accountable for the violation 
of access to basic services in poor countries. Thus, economic globalisation has also led to the state 
assuming a schizophrenic role. This poses a dilemma for agents of change such as social movements. For 
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many it is unclear how best to ‘engage with the state, which is both adversary and ally’ (ICHRP 2004: 61). 
For example, governments are best placed to provide economic and social rights protection through 
equitable budget allocations. Similarly, only the state and communities can ensure that economic actors 
properly regulate the behaviour of markets and operate in a fair and transparent manner and provide 
adequate social protection to those who suffer insecurity and a loss of rights. Still governments can 
enforce policies and programmes such as privatisation and structural adjustment that can erode people’s 
rights. While provisions exist for protection, for example, under the Water Service Act no disconnections 
can take place due to inability to pay, the onus of proving ability lies with the water user and will depend 
on the user’s ability to access legal advice and representation, which is definitely minimal in many 
communities (COHRE 2004: 54). Thus, links between ordinary citizens and their representatives in South 
Africa have become muffled through policy shifts towards GEAR and ‘fairly orthodox forms of neoliberal 
economic globalisation’ due to behind-the-border convergence and consensus between multilateral 
institutions, governments, and firms (Goetz and Jenkins 2004: 25). 
As Donnelly (1999: 628) says, ‘markets are social institutions designed to produce efficiency’. At 
times, though, markets may compromise social and economic rights since they ‘can systematically deprive 
some individuals in order to achieve the collective benefits of efficiency’ (ibid.). The impacts of structural 
adjustment programs are a good example of how the social and economic rights of poor people have 
suffered as a result of market-led growth strategies. While structural adjustment may have led to increased 
efficiency, they have had high social costs (Social Watch 2003). Similarly, regulation that merely focuses on 
efficiency and growth may not necessarily be committed to ensuring access to basic services or protecting 
access to services that prior to privatisation had reached out to the poorest (Cook and Minogue 2003). 
Similar contradictions exist with respect to dam-based displacement. Competing rights claims exist 
due to a lack of clarity around who has rights, whose rights are at risk and who is to be the duty-bearer to 
protect and fulfil the different rights. Take oustee displacement. The fact that it is legitimised through the 
overarching principles of ‘development’ and ‘national purpose’ has often made it traditionally difficult to 
contest the corrosion of basic rights. This is because oustees’ rights are pitted against the so-called rights 
of the larger population expected to benefit from the planned highway, road, park or dam. Increasingly, 
however, it is now acknowledged that such social development processes have been skewed in terms of 
how gains and pains are spread. Often a small and elite minority has benefited immensely, while a large 
silent group has borne disproportionate costs. Their concerns, rights and needs are however rarely 
captured in conventional cost-benefit analyses that tilt in favour of the interests of the rich and powerful. 
Such cost-benefit analyses are also silent about the hidden costs of such schemes (e.g. a total disregard of 
non-monetised resources and exchanges, downstream impacts of dams, and so on). As W. Cortland 
Robinson argues ‘Development is a right but it also carries risks to human life, livelihood, and dignity that 
must be avoided if it is to deserve the name’ (Robinson 2003: 59).24 Still, State governments may often be 
willing to violate civil and political rights when they evoke the principle of ‘eminent domain’. Thus oustee 
                                                          
24  See also Arundhati Roy’s evocative essay on the ‘Greater Common Good’ (1999).  
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attempts to seek redress can be tricky since the state is often both the perpetrator of human rights 
violations and the arbiter of justice. The Indian state also does not recognise several international rights 
regimes.25 While India has ratified the original ILO Convention 107, expert committees have constantly 
urged the Indian government to take ‘urgent measures to bring its resettlement and rehabilitation policies 
in line with the Convention’ (cited in Cullet 2000: 3 of 5).  
 
4.3 The politics of citizenship  
One reason why rights often do not make much of a difference to poor people is due to wider political 
factors and also a marked lack of political will on the part of powerful stakeholders to be partisan to the 
needs and interests of vulnerable citizens. As mentioned earlier, there is a tremendous reluctance on the 
part of global water players to endorse the human right to water. The South African case highlights 
problems that arise when adequate financial resources are not provided to realise rights to water and 
through contradictions arising from market-based approaches. However, promoting the human right to 
water can only be the result of a conscious socio-political choice on the part of decision-makers and local 
people. Financial allocations to basic services such as water are also part of such choices. The lack of 
financial resources is clearly a problem yet it is well known that the allocation of resources to prestigious 
projects and arms purchases often take place at the cost of neglecting social concerns coupled with 
unfavourable and anti-poor economic policies promoted by IFIs. For example, a mere 1 per cent off 
military budgets would easily match the additional US$9–15 billion estimated by the Water Supply and 
Sanitation Collaborative Council (WSSCC) for achieving the MDGs on water and sanitation through low 
cost technology and locally appropriate solutions. It is a lot of money but one cruise missile deployed in 
Iraq costs US$2.5 million and this is what the US government spends on defence every 10–15 days (see 
Mehta 2004 for more details).  
Also in the case of oustee displacement, there is a marked lack of official endorsement to shift from 
policies and programmes that focus on impacts and risks of displacement to upholding the rights of the 
displaced. For example, the World Bank, despite being one of the founding members of the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD), declined to adopt the rules of the WCD as the guiding principles of its 
operations. The WCD recommended, amongst other things, a decision making process that should strive 
towards balancing the rights and risks of all stakeholders, and in particular, protect the rights of groups 
such as indigenous peoples. But it is unlikely that states and institutions executing relocation and 
resettlement programmes will relinquish power to hitherto marginalised groups to make them respected 
equals in the process. Moreover, as Clark has demonstrated, the World Bank’s revised resettlement policy 
of 2001 waters down some of the strengths of its 1980 policy which clearly states that displaced people 
should benefit from the project and should have their original standard of living improved or at least 
restored (Clark, forthcoming).  For example,  the revised policy no longer applies  to those affected by the 
                                                          
25  Such as the updated 1989 107 ILO Convention which provides stronger rights to indigenous peoples (Cullet 
2000). 
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‘indirect’ impacts of a project (e.g. downstream impacts of a reservoir). Similarly the focus on the 
restoration of past incomes is a step back from embracing development-oriented objectives of improving 
life styles and livelihoods of project affected people (see criticisms by Scudder 1996; Clark forthcoming). 
It may also seriously disadvantage indigenous peoples, women and ethnic minorities who often lack 
formal legal rights to land, but whose rights are enshrined in customary arrangements. To underscore 
these measures are a step back from the previous provisions that provided compensation mechanisms to 
those without formal titles to the land. In sum, ‘access to the rights to those at the bottom of the pile can 
only be achieved by radical policy changes backed up with financial support’ (ICHRP 2004: 39). To do 
this strong commitments towards furthering the interests of the weak and marginalised are urgently 
required.  
 
5  Conclusion  
This paper has examined why citizens are denied economic and social rights through sins of omission and 
commission. Sins of omission take place due to the lack of financial resources, poor institutional capacity, 
poor awareness of rights and the lack of means to seek legal recourse. Sins of commission, by contrast, 
take place when rights are knowingly put at risk due to the lack of commitment to the citizenship rights of 
marginalised people, clear anti-poor and elite biases in institutions and significant accountability gaps at all 
levels to provide redress for rights violations. While the South African case largely focussed on the former 
and the India case addressed the latter, in both cases there is a blurriness between policy and practice 
around rights practice and violation and at times there are overlaps between sins of omission and 
commission.  
This makes me return to the title of this paper: Do human rights make a difference to marginalised 
and vulnerable people? And are rights ‘rights’ if nobody bothers to uphold them? Clearly, not having 
access to rights does not mean that the rights do not exist. Instead, it means people cannot enjoy their 
rights due to various obstacles such as those outlined in this paper and due to the lack of adequate 
protection in cases of gross violations.  
This should not detract from the fact that rights do and should matter. The success of high-profile 
resistance activities such as those on the Narmada dams depends on transnational alliances of NGOs, 
campaigns and movements. Here international human rights standards as well as the policy directives of 
international organisation such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO)26 and the World Bank are 
evoked and adapted to grant salience to local struggles and campaigns. These informal mechanisms of 
claiming rights and seeking accountability have been powerful agents of change. While success has often 
been more symbolic rather than material, they have often invariably transformed public and political 
attitudes as well as unleashed debates around social justice.  
                                                          
26  For example, ILO 107 and later ILO 169 which specifically deal with the rights of indigenous peoples.  
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Similarly, the right to water is internationally recognised by both developing and industrialised 
countries as defined in General Comment 15. It includes clearly defined and realisable obligations, and 
thus forms the basis of concrete negotiations between the state, the communities concerned and civil 
society advocates. Moreover, the right to water in principle provides justiciable components to local claims 
and struggles around water and can also be used as a countervailing force against the commodification of 
water which can impinge on poor people’s rights. That few people in South Africa or around the world 
are demanding compliance and answerability around the right to water is another matter. But local 
struggles to realise the right to water are on the rise and the demands for accountability from water 
providers and those responsible for protecting this right, will also therefore increase. In order for human 
rights to really make a difference, we can only hope that more attention will be paid to accountability 
mechanisms through which compliance and answerability become an indispensable aspect of the human 
rights regime.  
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